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INTRODUCTION
In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act (“PSLRA”)1 in “response to perceived abuses in securities fraud
litigation.”2 The purpose of the PSLRA was to “prevent an onslaught of
* Sharon Nelles is a partner in Sullivan & Cromwell LLP’s Litigation Group. Sharon
represents financial institutions and global companies in high-profile civil litigations and related
regulatory, congressional, and criminal investigations, and enforcement actions. She is currently
active in many matters arising from the subprime mortgage crisis and frequently conducts
investigations for corporate clients, special committees, and boards of directors.
** Hilary Huber started at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP in 2012 after a one-year clerkship.
Since joining the firm, she has been a part of teams representing financial institutions and global
companies in commercial litigation matters, particularly related to the issuance and trading of
securities and alleged fraudulent practices in connection with lending activities, as well as breach
of contract disputes.
1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
2. Swack v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 230 F.R.D. 250, 258 (D. Mass. 2005) (citing In re
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expensive and frivolous lawsuits when stock prices plummet, which
could force corporations to settle meritless claims to avoid the expense
of discovery and trial.”3 Since the PSLRA’s enactment, the plaintiffs’
bar has become increasingly critical of certain of its provisions—
particularly its heightened pleading standard.4 Although some criticism
may be justified, much of it ignores that the PSLRA was intended to
place the burden on plaintiffs to ensure they have a valid basis for
bringing a securities fraud suit. With diligent pre-filing investigations,
plaintiffs should be able to gather facts that adequately state a claim for
securities fraud, where such fraud truly exists.
This Article proceeds in three parts. First, it briefly describes the
PSLRA and how the Supreme Court’s decision in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Inc.5 addressed some of the PSLRA’s purported
ambiguities. The second Part briefly addresses some commentators’
contentions that the PSLRA and Tellabs created insurmountable hurdles
for plaintiffs at the motion to dismiss stage. Third, it walks through
some examples of “the good, the bad, and the ugly” of securities fraud
pleadings, with a focus on the “scienter” and “misstatements or
omissions” elements of a securities fraud claim. This third Part focuses
on the—often problematic—use of confidential witnesses to meet the
PSLRA’s heightened pleading standards.
I. THE PSLRA
A. The Purpose of the PSLRA
The PSLRA “was intended to address concerns that had been raised
about abuses believed to be associated with securities class action
lawsuits.”6 As its plain language indicates, the PSLRA was not enacted

Galileo Corp. S’holders Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 251, 260 (D. Mass. 2001)).
3. In re Accelr8 Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053–54 (D. Colo. 2001).
4. See, e.g., Wendy Gerwick Couture, Around the World of Securities Fraud in Eighty
Motions to Dismiss, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 553, 559 (2014) (showing that 53% of analyzed cases
were dismissed bases on insufficient scienter allegations); Charles Murdock, The Private
Litigation Securities Reform Act and Particularity: Why Are Some Courts in an Alternate
Universe?, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 616, 630 (2014) (arguing that the PSLRA’s heightened
particularity requirement has resulted in illogical or inconsistent applications of the Act by
courts); Steven A. Ramirez, The Virtues of Private Securities Litigation: An Historic and
Macroeconomic Perspective, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 669, 727 (2014) (arguing that “for securities
litigation to achieve its deterrent and compensatory purposes” securities pleading standards must
revert to their pre-PLSRA status).
5. 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
6. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 5–6 [hereinafter SEC REPORT], available at
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preemptively; it was enacted to address a very real issue. Prior to the
PSLRA, the availability of “wide-ranging discovery gave plaintiffs’
lawyers incentives to ‘file [frivolous] lawsuits in order to conduct
discovery in the hopes of finding a sustainable claim not alleged in the
complaint.’”7 In the normal course of civil litigation, once a complaint
was filed, “plaintiffs’ lawyers were free to impose massive costs on
defendants in the form of discovery requests.”8
At that time, many defendants “believed that they were victims of
meritless lawsuits which alleged ‘fraud by hindsight.’”9 In such suits,
the plaintiff would file a lawsuit immediately following a drop in a
company’s stock price, claiming that the drop served as “evidence that
the issuer and its agents had been misrepresenting the company’s
operations or performance in order to inflate its stock price.”10 More
often than not defendants were right: plaintiffs filed frivolous or
meritless lawsuits against “‘deep pocket’ defendants—whether or not
these defendants actually committed fraud—solely for their settlement
value.”11 A defendant, faced with the potentially enormous costs of
responding to discovery requests, would often cave to the pressure to
settle.12 This meant that innocent parties would settle frivolous
securities class actions to avoid a “potentially ruinous jury verdict.”13
These settlement costs, not insubstantial themselves, were generally
born by current shareholders.
The PSLRA was intended to curb these frivolous suits and decrease
the number of “vexatious, even extortionate class action filings” that
marked the pre-PSLRA securities litigation landscape.14 The statute has
three mechanisms to achieve this end: (1) a heightened pleading
standard, (2) a discovery stay during the pendency of any motion to
dismiss, and (3) a mandate that courts conduct an inquiry under Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.15

http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/lreform.txt.
7. Id. at 6–7.
8. Id. at 6.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 7.
14. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 952 F.Supp.2d 633, 634–
35 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)–(c) (2012).
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B. The PSLRA’s Heightened Pleading Standard
As noted above, the way that the PSLRA attempts to discourage
frivolous litigation is through a heightened pleading standard. The
PSLRA effectively replaced Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure as the applicable pleading standard in private securities
suits.16 It requires a plaintiff alleging securities fraud based on
misleading statements or omissions of material facts to “specify each
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why
the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement
or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state
with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.”17 Misleading
statements or omissions must have been misleading at the time the
statements were made; this prevents plaintiffs from asserting liability
based on events subsequent to the alleged fraud.18
The PSLRA further requires that plaintiffs “state with particularity
[the] facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with
the required state of mind.”19 This requirement is a “sharp break” from
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).20 Under the PSLRA, “‘a plaintiff
can no longer plead the requisite scienter element generally.’”21
Congress did not define the phrase “strong inference” or set forth a
rubric for courts to use to determine whether a plaintiff pled facts
sufficient to allege a “strong inference” of scienter. Although it is
axiomatic that an “inference” is a logical conclusion deduced by
considering relevant facts,22 ambiguity remained as to what facts courts
should consider as they try to determine whether a plaintiff sufficiently
alleged scienter and what makes an inference “strong.” This ambiguity
resulted in a circuit split, with courts across the country applying
different standards to determine whether a plaintiff alleged a “strong

16. See Rahman v. Kid Brands, Inc., 736 F.3d 237, 242 n.3 (3d Cir. 2013) (comparing Rule
9(b) with the pleading standards under the PLSRA).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B).
18. Rahman v. Kid Brands, Inc., No. 11–1624(JLL), 2012 WL 762311, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 8,
2012) (noting that “‘liability cannot be imposed on the basis of subsequent events’” (quoting In re
NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1330 (3d Cir. 2002))).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
20. Institutional Investors Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 253 (3d Cir. 2009).
21. Id. (quoting Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir. 2008)).
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2) (“[Plaintiffs must] state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”), with FED. R. CIV. P.
9(b) (“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged
generally.”).
22. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 778 (9th ed. 2009) (defining inference as “a conclusion
reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them”).
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inference” of scienter.23 For example, in the Seventh Circuit, a
complaint would survive if “a reasonable person could infer that the
defendant acted with the required intent.”24 The court did not require a
comparison of the relative strength of competing inferences (i.e., the
court would not compare a defendant’s innocent explanation for a drop
in a stock price with the plaintiff’s alleged fraud).25 In the Sixth Circuit,
however, “the strong inference requirement create[d] a situation in
which ‘plaintiffs [were] entitled only to the most plausible of competing
inferences.’”26 In other words, a court would have to decide whether
the plaintiff’s allegation of fraud was the most plausible explanation for
a stock price decline.
In light of the circuit split, approximately twelve years after the
PSLRA’s enactment, the Supreme Court decided Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Inc., in which it provided some guidance on the
troublesome and unsettled “strong inference” requirement in the
PSLRA.27 The Court decided that on a motion to dismiss, the trial court
judge must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and
then compare all of the culpable and nonculpable explanations that
could be drawn from them.28 An inference is “strong” only when the
culpable explanation is at least as likely as the non-culpable
explanation.29 The inference “must be cogent and compelling, thus
strong in light of other explanations.”30
Although it seemed like the Supreme Court’s Tellabs decision should
have resolved the pre-PSLRA circuit split over the “strong inference”
requirement, there remained a post-Tellabs divergence between the
lower courts.31 In accordance with Tellabs, it would seem that judges
should have begun their analysis of a securities fraud claim by making a
23. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319–20 (2007)
(contrasting the Second Circuit’s and Seventh Circuit’s approach to evaluating plaintiffs’
allegations of scienter upon a motion to dismiss).
24. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 602 (7th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 551
U.S. 308.
25. Id.
26. Id. (quoting Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 2004)).
27. Tellabs, 551 U.S. 308.
28. Id. at 310.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Resolving the Continuing Controversy
Regarding Confidential Informants in Private Securities Fraud Litigation, 19 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 637, 640 (2010) (positing that the Court “injected considerable uncertainty into the
pleading game” when it handed down its opinion in Tellabs); John M. Wunderlich, Note, Tellabs
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.: The Weighing Game, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 613, 682–84 (2008)
(contrasting circuit’s and district courts’ approaches to “strong inference” post-Tellabs).

NELLES AND HUBER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

658

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

4/1/2014 10:46 PM

[Vol. 45

“holistic” inquiry considering whether all of the facts alleged in the
complaint raise a “strong inference” of scienter.32 However, courts in
different circuits have applied Tellabs differently.
For example, post-Tellabs, the Second Circuit continues to hold that a
plaintiff may establish a “strong inference” of scienter “by
particularized allegations showing (1) that defendants had the ‘motive
and opportunity’ to commit fraud, or (2) there was strong circumstantial
evidence of ‘conscious misbehavior or recklessness.’”33 In doing so,
the Second Circuit has effectively reaffirmed its pre-Tellabs, arguably
plaintiff-friendly, jurisprudence.34
The Ninth Circuit continues to apply its pre-Tellabs case law as
well—but courts in this circuit applied a different test than those in the
Second Circuit before Tellabs and thus continued to do so after
Tellabs.35 The Ninth Circuit articulated a two-part test to determine
whether a plaintiff has sufficiently alleged scienter: (1) the court must
determine whether any of the allegations, standing alone, are sufficient
to create a strong inference of scienter and (2) if no allegation is alone
sufficient, then the court must conduct a “holistic” review of all of the
allegations “to determine whether the insufficient allegations combine
to create a strong inference of intentional conduct or deliberate
recklessness.”36
This post-Tellabs circuit split with respect to pleading “scienter”
makes it difficult to pin down precisely what standard of particularity is
required for the allegations to be considered a “strong inference.” Thus,
litigants in different circuits need to be cognizant of the standards in
their circuit and remain aware as the “strong inference” standard
continues to evolve.

32. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 326 (“[T]he court’s job is not to scrutinize each allegation in
isolation but to assess all the allegations holistically. In sum, the reviewing court must ask: When
the allegations are accepted as true and taken collectively, would a reasonable person deem the
inference of scienter at least as strong as any opposing inference?” (citations omitted)).
33. Arunesh Sohi, Circuits in Disarray Before and After Tellabs v. Makor: A Call For the
Supreme Court to Weigh in on Securities Fraud Pleading Requirements Again, 38 SEC. REG. L.J.
215 (2010).
34. Id.
35. See Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e
hold that the Court’s decision in Tellabs does not materially alter the particularity requirements
for scienter claims established in our previous decisions, but instead only adds an additional
‘holistic’ component to those requirements . . . .”).
36. N.M. State Inv. Council v. Ernst & Young, 641 F.3d 1089, 1095 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing
Zucco Partners, LLC, 552 F.3d at 991–92.).
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C. Additional Changes Under the PSLRA
As stated above, the PSLRA includes two additional requirements
that differentiate securities fraud suits from “standard” civil litigation.
First, the PSLRA provides that “all discovery and other proceedings
shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss, unless the
court finds upon the motion of any party that particularized discovery is
necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to that
party.”37 Second, the PSLRA requires courts to conduct a Rule 11
inquiry upon final adjudication of the suit.38 If the court determines that
compliance with Rule 11 is lacking, then it must impose sanctions on
the plaintiff for filing a frivolous suit.39
II. POST-PSLRA MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Securities fraud is a complicated area of law that continues to evolve
as courts in different circuits decide post-PSLRA, post-Tellabs motions
to dismiss securities fraud claims. Nevertheless, virtually every time a
plaintiff files a complaint alleging securities fraud, the defendant moves
to dismiss that complaint.40 Some commentators have argued that the
PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements, discovery stay, and
mandatory Rule-11 inquiry have transformed the motion to dismiss into
a significant access barrier for plaintiffs. 41 Some courts have even
called the 10b-5 motion to dismiss an “acid test,”42 an “eye of a needle
made smaller and smaller over the years by judicial decree and
congressional action,”43 and a return to “a ‘demurrer-like’ process that

37. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c).
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
40. See RENZO COMOLLI, SUKAINA KLEIN, RONALD I. MILLER & SVETLANA STARYKH,
NERA ECON. CONSULTING, RECENT TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2012
FULL-YEAR REVIEW 16 (2013) [hereinafter NERA, RECENT TRENDS], available at
http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Year_End_Trends_01.2013.pdf (“A motion to dismiss was
filed in more than 96% of all cases. Of the 4% of cases without a motion to dismiss, virtually all
ended with settlements.”).
41. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Toward a Just Measure of Repose: The
Statute of Limitations for Securities Fraud, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1547, 1582–83 (2010)
(asserting that heightened pleading standards increase the likelihood a claim will be dismissed);
John M. Wunderlich, The Importance of the Prefiling Phase for Securities-Fraud Litigation, 45
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 737, 740 (2014) (arguing that heightened pleading standards and increased
focus on the prefiling phase of securities litigation have created “access barriers” to plaintiffs
filing securities suits).
42. Eminence Capital, L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (per
curiam).
43. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F.3d 221, 235 (5th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam).
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creates considerable hurdles that a plaintiff must overcome before any
discovery is permitted.’”44
However, considering that the express purpose of the PSLRA is to
minimize the number of frivolous securities fraud suits,45 it should
come as no surprise that it is now more challenging for a plaintiff to
survive a motion to dismiss than it was before the law’s enactment.46 It
bears noting that the imposition of additional requirements on plaintiffs
attempting to plead a viable securities fraud claim has not made
defending against such claims commensurately easier on defendants
once a complaint is filed. After all, in some respects, the PSLRA
merely requires plaintiffs to do what they should have done anyway—
ensure there is a cognizable basis for a fraud claim, supported by
articulable facts, before filing their suit. Moreover, whereas plaintiffs
often have years to investigate and gather facts to develop their claims
before filing the complaint, defendants are often forced to respond to
the complaint within a matter of weeks. 47
Some commentators have gone so far as to say that the Supreme
Court’s Tellabs analysis “tilts steeply in favor of plaintiffs who, as
masters of their own complaints, can buttress their claims with as many
documents and witnesses as they please.”48 These commentators
maintain that Tellabs was in fact a pro-plaintiff decision because it held
that a plaintiff only has to show that their allegations are merely as
likely as any other nonculpable explanation.49 “In contrast, Tellabs
limits defendants to making their argument for exculpatory inferences
based only on the complaint that plaintiffs have written and such public
documents as have traditionally been relied upon by courts in
determining a motion to dismiss.”50
Securities fraud suits implicate billions of dollars and have “bet the
44. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 952 F. Supp. 2d 633, 635
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
45. SEC REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
46. See NERA, RECENT TRENDS, supra note 40, at 17 (“[Thirty-one percent] of [securities]
cases continue[] past the motion to dismiss, at least in part. In an additional 5% of cases,
dismissal was granted, though without prejudice.”); see also In re Accelr8 Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig.,
147 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1053–54 (D. Colo. 2001) (discussing heightened pleading standards under
the PLSRA).
47. Compare 28 USC § 1658 (2012) (setting the statute of limitations for a private securities
claim as two to five years), with FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (giving defendants twenty-one days to respond
to a compliant and summons).
48. Christopher J. Keller and Michael W. Stocker, ‘Tellabs’: PSLRA Pleading Test
Comparative, Not Absolute, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 3, 2007, http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/
id=900005492538#.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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company implications” for defendants. There should be high hurdles
and careful scrutiny. Those who argue that the PSLRA imposes
unreasonable pleading standards or that its (rarely invoked) Rule 11
provision51 is too harsh must consider that if there truly is a cognizable
basis to bring a fraud claim, then a diligent pre-filing investigation
should lead to evidence that supports that claim. And with this
evidence, regardless of the state of the post-Tellabs law in a given
circuit, there is a great likelihood that the complaint will survive a
motion to dismiss.
Successfully pleading a securities fraud claim is not as daunting a
task as it may seem. The next Part addresses some of the good, the bad,
and the ugly of securities fraud pleadings using some well-known
and/or recent examples from case law.
III. SECURITIES FRAUD PLEADINGS: THE GOOD, THE BAD, THE UGLY
A. The Good
We begin with “the good” and focus on a case with which most
readers are likely familiar: Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano.52 In
Matrixx Initiatives, the Supreme Court itself applied the Tellabs
standard for the first time. The case presented the question of whether a
plaintiff (Siracusano) could state a claim for securities fraud based on
the failure of Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. (“Matrixx”) to disclose reports of
adverse events associated with one of its products (a nasal spray that
was said to shorten the lifespan of a cold) even though the reports did
not disclose a “statistically significant number of adverse events.”53
The Court found the following alleged facts sufficient to show
scienter under the PSLRA:
1. Matrixx was concerned enough about the information it received
regarding the adverse effects of its product that it hired a consultant to
review the product, participated in animal studies, and convened a panel
of physicians and scientists in response to an academic researcher’s
presentation about how Matrixx’s product caused users to lose their
sense of smell;
2. Matrixx successfully prevented the academic researcher from
using its product’s name in his presentation; and
3. Matrixx issued a press release suggesting that studies had

51. See Couture, supra note 4, at __ (stating that out of thirty-nine opinions analyzed, only
four opinions made Rule 11 findings and in only one of those four cases did the court impose a
Rule 11 sanction).
52. 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011).
53. Id. at 1303.
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confirmed that its product did not cause users to lose their sense of
smell when, in fact, Matrixx had not conducted any studies of its own
and the scientific evidence at that time was insufficient to determine
whether the product did or did not have that effect.54
The Court considered these facts “collectively,” as required by its
Tellabs decision, and determined that they established a “‘cogent and
compelling’ inference that Matrixx elected not to disclose the reports of
adverse events . . . because it understood their likely effect on the
market.”55 Employing the Tellabs standard, the Court held, “‘[A]
reasonable person’ would deem the inference that Matrixx acted with
deliberate recklessness (or even intent) ‘at least as compelling as any
opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.’”56
Matrixx demonstrates that plaintiffs have available and should take
advantage of a combination of different sources and inferences to show
scienter at the pleading stage. The facts corroborating the claims here—
for example, the fact Matrixx had prevented the academic researchers
from using its product’s name in their presentation—were gathered
before discovery and without the plaintiffs taking any unethical or
unreasonable measures.57
Although some may consider Matrixx unusual because of the
existence of publically available research about a well-known product in
that case, there are numerous cases in which plaintiffs were likewise
able to gather facts sufficient to adequately plead a securities fraud
claim in less public circumstances. Consider, for example, Borneo
Energy Sendirian Berhad v. Sustainable Power Corp.58 Here, plaintiff
Borneo Energy Sendirian Berhad (“Borneo Energy”), learned that the
defendant, Sustainable Power Corp. (“Sustainable Power”), had a
technology that it claimed could produce “‘Vertroleum,’ a biofuel, from
various materials, including palm waste.”59 Borneo Energy was
“interested in developing the potential of such waste.”60
Borneo Energy alleged that Sustainable Power’s representatives
made a number of representations about its products upon which it

54. Id.
55. Id. 1324–25 (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323–24
(2007)).
56. Id. at 1325 (citing Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324).
57. See Brief for Respondents at 5–17, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1309 (No. 09-1156)
(describing the plaintiffs’ evidence supporting their allegations of scienter and materiality).
58. 646 F. Supp. 2d 860 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
59. Id. at 863.
60. Id.
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relied when it purchased shares of Sustainable Power’s stock.61 A few
months after the stock purchase, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) sued Sustainable Power for securities fraud
arising from representations similar to those it made to Borneo
Energy.62 Shortly thereafter, Borneo Energy brought a private litigation
alleging securities fraud against Sustainable Power. Finding that
Borneo Energy adequately pleaded misrepresentation, the court
explained:
The complaint specifies the speaker (Rivera), the statements
(representations about Vertroleum and test results relating to it,
Sustainable Power’s business, the existence of contracts to sell
Vertroleum, the presence of plans to generate electricity from biogas,
that Sustainable Power was being audited and would shortly be able to
produce audited financials and other information, and the omitted
information about the SEC investigation into Rivera). The complaint
also specifies the date, place, and circumstances of the statements, and
the basis for alleging that they were fraudulent when made.63

On the basis of these allegations, the court found that the complaint
“alleged with particularity that Rivera knew that the Vertroleum did not
meet the certain biofuel standards or fertilizer standards, although it was
represented to meet them.”64 In other words, these alleged facts met the
heightened standard required to plead the “misrepresentation” element
of a securities fraud claim. Borneo Energy, like Matrixx, shows that
gathering the facts necessary to state a non-frivolous securities fraud
claim does not require extraordinary measures. Prospective plaintiffs
should investigate whether the SEC or other regulatory agencies have
brought any charges against the potential defendant that would help
bolster the claims in a securities fraud civil litigation.
B. The Bad
Next, we turn to some examples of “the bad”—securities fraud
pleadings that simply do not rise to the level of particularity necessary
under the PSLRA. In In re Boston Scientific Corporation Securities
Litigation, the First Circuit considered a plaintiff shareholders’ security
fraud claims against a medical device manufacturer.65 Finding the
complaint did not adequately plead scienter, the First Circuit explained:
In cases where we have found the pleading standard satisfied, the

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 864.
Id. at 868.
Id.
Id.
686 F.3d 21, 26–27(1st Cir. 2012).
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complaint often contains clear allegations of admissions, internal
records or witnessed discussions suggesting that at the time they made
the statements claimed to be misleading, the defendant officers were
aware that they were withholding vital information or at least were
warned by others that this was so.66

No such direct evidence was pled in the complaint here. In fact, the
plaintiffs did not identify any basis for imputing wrongful intent.67 And
the allegedly omitted information was not of such powerful importance
that wrongful intent could reasonably be inferred.68 In short, the
plaintiffs failed to allege any facts that tended to show securities
fraud—let alone created a strong inference of such fraud.
The Third Circuit likewise affirmed the dismissal of a securities fraud
claim in Barnard v. Verizon Communications Inc.,69 in which the
district court found that the complaint did not meet the heightened
pleading requirements of the PSLRA.70 The Third Circuit held that
what was already the plaintiff’s second amended complaint “did not
provide any facts from which one could ascertain whether the
defendants made any actionable misrepresentations or omissions at
all.”71 The “closest” the plaintiff came to alleging a misrepresentation
or omission was a reference to one of the defendants’ annual statements,
but the plaintiff “failed to indicate how, if at all, the annual statements
could be interpreted as material misrepresentations or omissions.”72
These complaints exemplify precisely the kind of securities fraud
suits the PSLRA was designed to prevent. Even after multiple attempts
to plead their claims, these plaintiffs did not sufficiently allege a
securities fraud claim. This failure was not because the PSLRA’s
heightened pleading requirements are onerous or unreasonable, but
rather because the complaints lacked any facts corroborating the
plaintiffs’ respective fraud claims. Indeed, it seemed that no such
corroborating facts existed. Thus, while some may argue that the
PSLRA has made it unreasonably difficult to survive a motion to
dismiss, the reality is that dismissal of these meritless cases before
discovery commences serves the PSLRA’s purpose by eliminating weak
or frivolous claims as early as possible.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 31.
Id.
Id.
451 F. App’x 80 (3d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 85.
Id.
Id.
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C. The Ugly
One unfortunate side effect of the PSLRA appears to be the rise of
unscrupulous behavior by plaintiffs and/or their counsel during the prefiling investigation period and when stating the allegations in the
complaint. This behavior exemplifies the “ugly” side of securities fraud
pleadings. This Section considers two examples of the “ugly,” both of
which involve confidential witness statements.73
First, in City of Pontiac General Employees’ Retirement Systems v.
Lockheed Martin Corp.,74 the defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint and the court stayed discovery until it ruled on the
defendant’s motion, pursuant to the PSLRA.75 Eventually, the court
denied the motion to dismiss, basing its decision in part on the alleged
statements of confidential witnesses set forth in the complaint.76
After issuing its denial of the motion to dismiss, the court lifted the
discovery stay and the discovery process ensued, during which the
defendants deposed the individuals who served as the confidential
witnesses in the complaint.77 Based on those depositions, the
defendants learned, and later asserted in their motion for summary
judgment, that several of the confidential witnesses on which the
complaint relied “‘recanted’ statements attributed to them” and/or
“denied making such statements in the first place.”78 The plaintiffs
contended that the recanting confidential witnesses changed their stories
because of pressure from the defendants.79
Noting that the parties’ “competing assertions raised serious
questions, going well beyond the legal issues presented by summary
judgment,” and in the interest of protecting “the integrity of the
adversary process itself,”80 the court sua sponte directed the five
confidential witnesses to appear in court, along with the plaintiffs’

73. The use of confidential witnesses in securities fraud pleadings has raised a number of
ethical issues that have been written about in great detail. See e.g., Kaufman & Wunderlich,
supra note 31, at 661–62 (discussing the appropriate inquiry for assessing the validity of
confidential witnesses); Gideon Mark, Confidential Witnesses in Securities Litigation, 36 J.
CORP. L. 551, 551 (2011) (examining two issues presented by relying on confidential witnesses in
securities pleadings). This Article does not purport to address even a small number of those
issues; it merely considers a couple of noteworthy examples from recent case law.
74. No. 11 Civ. 5026(JSR), 2013 WL 3389473 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2013).
75. Id. at *1 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012)).
76. Id. at *2.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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private investigator.81 After hearing the witnesses testify in court, the
judge determined that some of the confidential witnesses “had been
lured by the investigator into stating as ‘facts’ what were often mere
surmises, but then, when their indiscretions were revealed, felt
pressured into denying outright statements.”82
This determination led the presiding judge, the Honorable Jed
Rakoff, to directly address “the ugly” of securities fraud pleadings in his
order on the motion for summary judgment: “While [the PSLRA was]
designed to give district courts a ‘gatekeeper’ responsibility to derail
dubious class action lawsuits at the outset, an unintended consequence
has been to cause plaintiffs’ counsel to undertake surreptitious prepleading investigations designed to obtain ‘dirt’ from dissatisfied
corporate employees.”83 Judge Rakoff further stated:
It seems highly unlikely that Congress or the Supreme Court [in its
Tellabs decision], in demanding a fair amount of evidentiary detail in
securities class action complaints, intended to turn plaintiffs’ counsel
into corporate “private eyes” who would entice naive or disgruntled
employees into gossip sessions that might help support a federal
lawsuit.84

In the next example, City of Livonia Employees’ Retirement System v.
Boeing Co.,85 the plaintiffs also relied on a confidential witness’s
statements to support their allegations of securities fraud in their
amended complaint. The plaintiffs’ counsel “represented to the court
that the confidential source was a former Boeing senior structural
analyst and chief engineer who worked on the 787 team.”86 Further,
“[p]laintiffs led the court to believe that the confidential source had
direct ‘access to’ and ‘firsthand knowledge [about]’” the facts at issue in
that case.87 The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint,
and the court “summarily denied” the motion, based in part on its belief
that the confidential witness had personal knowledge of the fact
attributed to him in the complaint.88
The defendants’ counsel later deposed the confidential witness, who
“consistently denied that he was the source of the information attributed
81. Id.
82. Id. at *3.
83. Id.
84. Id. at *4.
85. No. 09 C 7143, 2011 WL 824604 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2011) aff’d in part, vacated in part,
711 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2013).
86. Id. at *3.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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to him in the second amended complaint”—and in fact denied he was
ever employed by Boeing.89 Armed with this testimony, the defendants
filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of their motion to
dismiss, which the court granted.90 Upon reconsideration, the court
dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice, explaining:
The second amended complaint would have been dismissed, possibly
with prejudice, as insufficient under the PSLRA [if not for the
confidential witness statement]. It matters not whether, as plaintiffs
argue, [the confidential witness] told their investigators the truth, but
he is lying now for ulterior motives. The reality is that the
informational basis for [the allegations attributed to him are] at best
unreliable and at worst fraudulent . . . .91

As it turned out, the plaintiffs’ counsel never even met with the
confidential witness before “adding the confidential source allegations
to the second amended complaint, and counsel apparently never verified
the hearsay reports of their investigators concerning [the confidential
witness’s] position at Boeing or the basis of his purported personal
knowledge.”92 The court noted that the “unseemly conflict between
plaintiffs’ confidential source and plaintiffs’ investigators could have
been avoided by reasonable inquiry on the part of plaintiffs’ counsel
before filing the second amended complaint.”93
Here, counsels’ failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry to determine
whether confidential witness sources were credible before using their
statements in the complaints cost the plaintiffs their case. 94 If counsel
had determined early on that the confidential sources were questionable,
they could have used other evidence, or perhaps tried to find another
confidential witness, to sufficiently allege the plaintiffs’ fraud claims.
If no such evidence existed, then plaintiffs’ counsel should not have
filed the complaint.
As Judge Rakoff recognized in City of Pontiac, the PSLRA was
intended to discourage plaintiffs from filing frivolous securities fraud
suits—not to encourage them to engage in unethical or unprofessional
behavior in an attempt to piece together a securities fraud claim.
Counsel must remember that credibility plays a large role in a court’s
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at *2.
92. Id.
93. Id. at *4.
94. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s dismissal with prejudice. The appellate
court vacated in part and remanded the case, however, “for consideration, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §
78u-4(c)(1), (2), of whether to impose Rule 11 sanctions on the plaintiffs’ lawyers and if so in
what amount.” City of Livonia Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co., 711 F.3d 754, 762 (7th Cir. 2013).
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decisions throughout the course of litigation, and to lose or put in
question the credibility of the plaintiff, counsel, or the lawsuit during
the pleading stage could have dire repercussions, even if the complaint
survives.
CONCLUSION
The PSLRA must raise the bar for securities fraud plaintiffs if it is to
achieve its goals of preventing frivolous or meritless securities fraud
claims. However, if plaintiffs take the pre-filing investigation period
seriously and gather facts that enable them to adequately plead their
securities fraud claims, those claims should be able to survive a motion
to dismiss. Moreover, if plaintiffs fail to clear the PSLRA’s hurdles
with their first complaint, they almost always will be permitted to file an
amended complaint—and if they cannot meet the PSLRA’s standards
by that point, then perhaps they do not have a viable claim. Pleading an
adequate securities fraud claim can be done and it can be done with a
reasonable amount of effort. It is the plaintiffs’ responsibility to do the
work necessary to uncover the facts supporting any allegations of
fraud—and to do it ethically—before filing a lawsuit.

